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ABSTRACT
I study the security design problem of a ﬁrm when investors rather than managers have
private information about the ﬁrm. I ﬁnd that it is often optimal to issue information-sensitive
securities like equity. The “folklore proposition of debt” from traditional signalling models only
goes through if the ﬁrm can vary the face value of debt with investor demand. When the ﬁrm has
several assets, debt backed by a pool of assets is optimal when the degree of competition among
investors is low, while equity backed by individual assets can be optimal when competition is
high.
Most information-based theories of security design, starting with Myers and Majluf (1984),
make the assumption that the issuing ﬁrm has private information about the value of its assets.
This leads to a problem for the ﬁrm when it attempts to raise capital, since investors will worry
about being sold a lemon. A genuinely good ﬁrm that cannot signal its quality properly to the
market will face underpricing when it issues securities, and will design the securities to mimimize
this underpricing. The theory has been applied fruitfully to explain ﬁnancing behavior of ﬁrms.
One of the more robust predicitions that emerges is the “folklore proposition of debt”: Under
relatively weak assumptions, the ﬁrm should issue the least information sensitive security possible,
which is standard debt.1 Another predicition is that if the ﬁrm has access to several assets, issuing
securities backed by the entire pool of assets may also help to reduce underpricing (see DeMarzo
(2005)).
WI am grateful to Nick Barberis, Phil Bond, Peter DeMarzo, Doug Diamond, Matt Jackson, Ilan Kremer, Robert
McDonald, Per Stromberg and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments, as well as to seminar participants
at Carnegie Mellon University, Duke University, Stockholm School of Economics, University of Chicago, University
of Minnesota, Washington University in StLouis, the AFA meetings, and the NBER corporate ﬁnance meetings.
1A problem that has achieved much less attention is the one that appears when investors, rather
than the ﬁrm itself, have private information about the prospects of the issuer. I argue that this
is often just as important a friction in ﬁnancial markets. For example, a start-up company seeking
ﬁnancing usually has to raise money from professional intermediaries such as venture capitalists or
banks. These investors, based on their industry expertise and long experience in ﬁnancing, may
be better at evaluating the likely success of the ﬁrm than the entrepreneur. When the ﬁrm issues
securities at later stages in its life-cycle, such as in an IPO, there is also evidence consistent with the
existence of investor private information. In a typical book-building procedure, more “informative”
bids are rewarded with a higher allocation, as is documented by Cornelli and Goldreich (2001),
and the persistent underpricing in IPOs could be interpreted as informational rents captured by
investors.
Asset-backed securities markets is another setting where investor private information may be
a driving force for security design. For example, consider the sale of assets performed by the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in the 1990’s. The RTC was set up as a government agency
in 1989 under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act to dispose of the
assets of failed savings and loans institutions. It was clear that the RTC had very little expertise in
valuing these assets, as opposed to the eventual buyers who were sometimes the original owners of
the assets. Initially, the RTC used mostly individual sales of assets, generating very little volume.
Through the use of pooled asset auctions and securitized issues, the RTC had sold $455 billion
worth of assets by 1995 (see Vandell and Riddiough (1992) and Watkins (1992)).2
The goal of this paper is to characterize what implications investor private information has for
the optimal security design of the ﬁrm. In particular, I try to answer the following questions: Does
the folklore proposition of debt still hold when the asymmetric information problem is switched
around, or should the ﬁrm under some circumstances issue a more informationally sensitive security?
When it has access to several assets, should it issue securities backed by a pool of assets or individual
assets? When investors no longer are price-takers who make zero proﬁts, as they are assumed to be
in the signalling literature, how does the degree of competition among investors aect the optimal
security design?
Just as in ﬁrm private information models, securities will be underpriced when investors have
private information. This is because investors will only purchase securities at a price favorable to
them. In both cases, the role of the security design is to minimize underpricing while raising the
right amount of capital to satisfy investment needs. The models are also similar in that debt is the
2least information sensitive security and therefore has the least amount of underpricing per dollar
of capital raised. The dierence is that when the ﬁrm knows less than investors, it does not know
how much capital a certain security will raise, or how much capital it actually needs. The crucial
new role of the security design is therefore to make sure that the amount of capital raised covaries
in the right way with investor information.
I show that this dierence can lead to the optimality of information sensitive securities. An
information sensitive security like equity will raise more money in good states than in bad relative
to debt. If raising capital is more valuable in good states than in bad, this can be su!ciently
beneﬁcial to outweigh the higher underpricing per dollar raised. I identify two separate reasons
for why raising more in good states can be valuable. First, this is the case if the asymmetric
information problems are smaller in good states, so that the cost of raising capital goes down.
Second, if the investment opportunity of the ﬁrm is more valuable in good states the beneﬁt of
raising capital goes up. Debt will then tend to raise too much capital in bad states, where it is
not su!ciently needed to justify the cost of raising capital, and too little in good states, where the
marginal productivity of capital more than outweighs the cost.
I also show that the net beneﬁt of information sensitive securities is larger when the market is
more competitive. When markets are more competitive, the underpricing is smaller for all securities
so the cost disadvantage of information sensitivity goes down. Also, a more competitive market
leads to more informative prices which translates into a bigger dierence in capital raising between
debt and information sensitive securities. Therefore the capital raising advantage of information
sensitivity goes up as the market becomes more competitive.
The results above were derived for the case when the ﬁrm has to design the security at an ex
ante stage. When the ﬁrm can vary the security design as a function of investor information, for
example by issuing several securities with dierent reserve prices or issuing securities sequentially,
the folklore proposition of debt is recovered. By letting the face value of debt be determined by
investor demand, the ﬁrm can still make sure that it raises the right amount of capital in each
state.
I go on to study the case where the ﬁrm has many assets. I show that when the number of assets
is large enough, it is optimal to issue debt backed by the whole pool of assets rather than issuing
securities backed by single assets. Pooling dilutes private information by averaging information
across many assets, which helps to reduce underpricing. Debt is optimal because when assets are
pooled, the amount of capital raised with a security becomes more predictable, so that the capital
3raising beneﬁt of information sensitive securities disappears.
However, if the degree of competition is high relative to the number of assets, issuing information
sensitive securities backed by individual assets can be optimal. When the degree of competition
is high, the price will be set by investors from the upper tail of the information distribution. The
underpricing depends on how much asymmetry of information there is between these investors. In
the sale of a single asset, these top investors are more likely to have the same information, since
they only need to agree about one asset. In the sale of a pool, information about all assets is
relevant, which increases the potential for dierences in information. Separate sales will dominate,
and information sensitive securities will be beneﬁcial, since they tend to raise most of their capital
exactly in the favorable state where information asymmetries are small.
The theory delivers several empirical predictions, and may shed light on some observed phenom-
ena in ﬁnancial markets. First, it shows that equity issues should be more commonly observed for
ﬁrms with highly variable growth opportunities, and in markets where the degree of competition is
high. Second, it explains the role of state contingent security design such as sequential debt issues
and allowing investors to bid with securities. Third, it may explain why debt is the dominating
choice in asset-backed securities markets where large pools of assets back securities, while equity
issues are more prevalent when the asset base is more focused (as is the case for individual ﬁrms).
I discuss in the conclusion how the results developed here may also be helpful in understanding life
cycle patterns of ﬁnancing for a ﬁrm, the dierence in ﬁnancing between bank oriented and market
oriented systems, and the role of ﬁnancial intermediation.
Related literature
It is interesting to contrast the results in my paper a bit further with the results developed in the
signalling literature, especially in the paper by DeMarzo (2005) that studies the same pooling and
security design problem when the seller is endowed with private information. As in my model,
retaining cash ﬂow is costly for the seller. Issuers signal their quality by retaining more. Worse
issuers gain the least by mimicking a debt issue by a better ﬁrm, and therefore debt is the optimal
security since it allows a good ﬁrm to retain as little as possible without being mimicked. Because
ﬁrms signal through retention, the face value of debt will be decreasing in the quality of the issuer,
while in my setting the face value of debt is often increasing in the quality of the ﬁrm. Also, in
DeMarzo’s set up, there is no role for equity, since the ﬁrm knows exactly how much capital will be
raised. DeMarzo also shows that “pure” pooling is never optimal: Unless a debt security backed
4by the pool can be issued, separate sales dominate. This is because pooling destroys valuable
opportunities to cherry pick the assets that should be retained, and is in contrast to the solution
with investor private information, where pure pooling serves to dilute potentially damaging private
information. However, the two models have the same prediction that when the asset base is large
enough, and assets are not too correlated, pooling backed by debt is an optimal security design.
The intuition is also similar. When the number of assets is large enough, debt can be made virtually
risk-free, hence eliminating all private information problems.
Maybe most closely related to my paper is a recent, independently developed paper by DeMarzo,
Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2003). They study a model where investors bid with securities, and also
show that debt is optimal when the issuer has su!cient commitment power in the sales mechanism.
In contrast to this paper, their setting is one in which the value of the company is determined by
which investor is chosen, and where values and signals are independent across investors.
Garmaise (1997) also examines an auction model with informed investors. In his model, two
informed investors oer securities to a ﬁrm in a ﬁrst price auction. The results are driven by the fact
that investors view the entrepreneur as being either overly optimistic or overly pessimistic, leading
to debt in the ﬁrst case and equity in the second case. There is no analysis of how the degree of
competition aects the security design. Garmaise (2001) does look at the eect of increasing the
number of bidders in a one-asset situation. Although his focus is very dierent, he does derive the
result that debt is optimal in common value auctions because it serves to minimize the dierence
of opinions between bidders.
Otherwise, the investor private information problem has not received much attention in the
security design literature. Comprehensive surveys of the security design literature can be found in
Harris and Raviv (1991) and, more recently, in Allen and Winton (1995). Neither of these surveys
discuss the investor private information problem. The idea that outside investors may have private
information is not completely new to the corporate ﬁnance literature, however. As opposed to the
view in this paper, the focus has mostly been on the positive role of informed investors. Allen (1993)
and Habib and Johnsen (2000), for example, emphasize the beneﬁts of security price information
in guiding investment decisions of the ﬁrm. Somewhat more closely related to this paper, Boot
and Thakor (1993) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) extend the signalling literature to allow some
investors to acquire information about the value of assets. The security design motive in these
papers ultimately stems from signalling considerations, however. Good ﬁrms want to separate
themselves from bad ﬁrms, and might therefore issue equity securities to encourage information
5production about their assets. None of these papers discuss the role of security design in screening
investors.
In a trading context, Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) and Subrahmanyam (1991) use Kyle-type
models to explain the existence of basket securities in stock markets. They show that liquidity
traders can avoid getting picked o by informed traders by trading in pooled securities like stock-
index futures. Even though there is no issuer doing any security design in their models, the intuition
for these results is similar to the intution for why pooling may help in reducing underpricing in my
model. Similarly, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) show that ﬁrms or ﬁnancial intermediaries have an
incentive to split cash ﬂows into debt and equity so that uninformed traders can protect themselves
against losses to informed traders. None of these papers study the impact of an increased degree
of competition on the security design.
I. Model Set-Up
There are two time periods, 0 and 1. Everyone is risk-neutral and the discount rate is normalized
to one. A single seller owns an asset with stochastic pay-o ] 5 [0>}] in period 1. The random
variable ] has a cumulative distribution function J(}) with associated density j (}) A 0.3>4
The seller also has access to a constant returns to scale project that pays o   (1 + u(]))
in or after period 1 if  i si n v e s t e di np e r i o d0 . 5 I allow for the possibility that the investment
opportunity can co-vary with the pay-o of the asset, as captured by the dependence of u on ]=6
The typical case is that u(]) is non-decreasing. I also allow for the possibility that u(]) can be
negative over some range. This captures the notion that there can be a marginal transaction cost
for raising money on top of the informational rents given up, such as a proportional brokerage fee.7
The seller is liquidity constrained but can raise money by issuing securities backed by the cash
ﬂow of the asset.8 I write a security as a pay-o function z(]) that depends on the realization of
the asset cash-ﬂow. The security is sold at price  in an auction procedure deﬁned below, where
the price depends both on the security design and the information of investors.
The private information of investors is modelled as follows. There are Q bidders in the auc-
tion of the security= Each bidder q 5 {1>===>Q} draws a privately observed signal [q which is
informative about the value of the asset. Conditional on the realized value of the asset, signals are
distributed identically and independently according to the probability density i ({|}) A 0= Id e n o t e
the associated cumulative distribution function by I ({|}). I assume that the signal distribution





i({0|}0 ) if {A{ 0 and }A} 0> with strict inequality for some {>{0.
The MLRP assumption assures that signals are informative, and a higher signal leads to a more
optimistic view of the value of the underlying asset.9
Inherently discrete information structures, where a signal D can take on integer values from 0
to K with probability D = d given by S (d|})> are captured in this continuous framework by letting
[ 5 [0>K+1 )and setting i({|})=i({0|})=S (d|}) if {>{0 5 [d>d +1 ) =10
The maximization problem of the seller can now be stated as follows:
max
z(])
H(u)  H (z  ) (1.1)
subject to:
Equilibrium z> constitutes an equilibrium in the sales mechanism.
Limited liability 0  z(})  } for all }=
Monotonicity z(}) and }  z(}) are nondecreasing in }=
The term H(u) in the maximand is the expected social surplus generated by investing  at the
excess return u= The second term is the expected underpricing of the security, and can be viewed
as the informational rent given to investors.
The constraint 0  z(}) is a condition of limited liability for bidders: Once the security is
bought, they are not obliged to provide any additional cash ﬂow in period 1. The constraint
z(})  } is a limited liability constraint on the seller reﬂecting his limited wealth outside of the
cash ﬂow generated by assets.
The monotonicity assumption is standard in the security design literature and can be formally
justiﬁed on grounds of moral hazard in period 1.11>12
I I .E xA n t eS e c u r i t yD e s i g n
I ﬁrst study the situation when the security z is ﬁxed in advance and so its design is not contingent
on any investor information that may be elicited in the sales mechanism. I refer to this as ex ante
security design. A Treasury auction, in which the government decides to sell a prespeciﬁed amount
of a bond with prespeciﬁed coupons and maturity, can be viewed as an example of ex ante security
design. An initial public oering where a ﬁrm preregisters equity is another example.
7A. Sales mechanism
I assume that securities are sold in sealed bid, uniform price Nunit auctions that work as follows.
Investors submit bids, and the N investors with the highest bids get an equal allocation of the
security at the market clearing price which equals the highest loosing bid (the N +1 :st highest
bid). Spreading the allocation out over several investors can reﬂect a capital constraint of investors.
Alternatively, the number of units can be a choice variable of the issuer.
The uniform price auction is a standard auction format that closely resembles many allocation
mechanisms in ﬁnancial markets, for example Treasury auctions. IPO bookbuilding procedures, in
which investors submit indications of interest followed by a posted price oe r i n gt ot h ei n v e s t o r s
with the highest indications, is also equivalent to a uniform price auction.13 Although the sales
mechanism is standard, it should be pointed out that it is exogenously speciﬁed and may not be the
optimal mechanism from the sellers point of view. I discuss the robustness of the security design
results to other choices of mechanisms in Section IV.
The equilibrium of the auction was ﬁrst characterized by Milgrom (1981)= Denote by {\1>===>\ Q}
the order statistics of investor signals, so that \1  ===  \Q= Equilibrium bids are increasing in the
investor signal {, and since the price is equal to the N +1:st highest bid, the equilibrium price is a
function of the signal \N+1 alone. Denoting by (z>|) the price in the auction of security z when
\N+1 = |> the equilibrium price is given by:
Lemma 1. The price in a sealed bid, uniform price, N -unit auction of security z when \N+1 = |
is given by
 (z>|)=H (z|\N = \N+1 = |)
Proof. This and all the following proofs are in the appendix.
An investors will bid so that he is indierent between winning and loosing when he just mar-
ginally wins, which is when he ties with the marginal loser. Notice that this creates underpricing in
equilibrium. Upon observing the price  (z>|), or, equivalently, the signal \N+1 = |> the expected
value of a security is H (z|\N+1 = |)> which is higher than the price H (z|\N = \N+1 = |) since
the marginal winning investor typically ends up having a higher signal than the marginal loser. A
major role for the security design is to minimize this underpricing.14
8B. Security Design
To further simplify the problem, it is convenient to decompose a security into its “smallest compo-
nent” securities where each component security pays one if cash ﬂow is above a certain threshold }
and zero otherwise. I denote such a security by an indicator function 1]D}. The following lemma
states that any security design can be viewed as a portfolio of such component securities.










g} 5 [0>1]> and any security written in this way satisﬁes limited liability and monotonicity.
The cut-o } is a measure of how “leveraged”, or information sensitive, a component security
is. Debt includes all component securities with a cut-o below the face value of debt, while a call
option contains all component securities with a cut-o above the strike price of the option.
From the linearity of the pricing function, the maximization problem 1.1 can now be expressed
as a decision of which component securities to auction o:
max











This has a simple solution: Include component security 1]D} in the security design (set
gz(})
g} =1 )
if the expected beneﬁt given by H (u(1]D}>\ N+1)) exceeds the expected underpricing given by
H (1]D}   (1]D}>\ N+1))= Otherwise, do not include it. The following proposition summarizes
the solution to the security design problem.







1 if !(})  0




H (u(1]D}>\ N+1))  H (1]D}  (1]D}>\ N+1))
H ((1]D}>\ N+1))
9The function !(}) is the net beneﬁt of raising a dollar in expectation using component security
1]D}= Debt is optimal if !(}) is decreasing, while a call option is optimal if it is increasing.
To illustrate the forces that aect the choice of information sensitivity it is useful to further




where !(}||) is the conditional net beneﬁt deﬁned as
!(}||)  H (u|\N+1 = |) 
H (1]D}|\N+1 = |)  (1]D}>|)
 (1]D}>|)
and t(}||) is the capital raising function for security 1]D} deﬁned as
t(}||) 
(1]D}>|)i (\N+1 = |)
H ( (1]D}>\ N+1))
These functions have the following interpretation. The capital raising function t(}||) is a
weighting function that shows what proportion of the expected capital raised with component
security 1]D} comes from state \N+1 = |= The conditional net beneﬁt !(}||) is the seller’s net
gain per dollar raised in state \N+1 = | using security 1]D}= The following lemma shows that for
two securities that raise the same amount of capital in a given state, the less information sensitive
security always has a higher net beneﬁt in that state:
Lemma 3. !(}||) is decreasing in }=
The intuition is simple. If two securities raise the same amount of capital  in a state, they
produce the same revenues u= However, the underpricing is higher for the more information sen-
sitive security, since the downward revision of the marginal winner’s signal in the pricing function
matters more the more information sensitive the security is. This is a driving force for reducing
information sensitivity.
The potentially positive eect of information sensitivity is that more information sensitive se-
curities tend to raise more capital in high states relative to low states, as the following lemma
shows:
Lemma 4. For }A} 0>
t(}||)
t(}0||) is increasing in |.
10This can be beneﬁcial for two reasons: First, if the conditional underpricing is decreasing in
the state, a security that raises more in high states may feature lower unconditional underpricing.
Second, raising more in high states is also better if the beneﬁt of raising capital H (u|\N+1 = |) is
increasing in the state. Before giving general conditions for when information sensitive securities
are optimal, I illustrate these eects in an example.
B.1. Example
Suppose cash ﬂow ] is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, and investors get either high or
low signals with S (High|})=}, S (Low|})=1 }= There are two bidders and one unit sold. Thus,
the price setting signal \N+1 is either high (when both bidders have high signals) or low (when at
least one bidder has a low signal).15 Also, suppose the productivity of capital H (u|\N+1 = |) is
non-decreasing in |=
The following table gives the inputs necessary to calculate the optimal security design:
\N+1 S (\N+1) H(u|\N+1) (1]D}>\ N+1) H(1]D}|\N+1) !(}|\N+1) t(}|\N+1)
High 1







3 uO (1  })
3 (1  })
3 + 3
2} (1  })









Here, uK  H (u|\N+1 = High)  uO  H (u|\N+1 = Low)=
Note that the underpricing H(1]D}||) (1]D}>|) is zero in the high state. If the loser’s signal
is high, the price is set as if both investors had high signals. Hence, since the winner must also have
had a high signal, there is no underpricing= However, if the loser’s signal is low, the price is set as
if both investors had low signals while in actuality the winner might have had a high signal, which
leads to underpricing. Note that this underpricing is increasing in }> which is a cost of information
sensitivity.
The beneﬁt of information sensitivity is that a higher proportion of the capital is raised in
the high state, where the underpricing is zero and the productivity of capital is the highest. The
11unconditional beneﬁt !(}) can be calculated as
!(})=!(}|High)  t(}|High)+!(}|Low)  t(}|Low)










The middle line is increasing in }> reﬂecting the productivity advantage of information sensitivity.
The last line is the expected underpricing, which is increasing in } for }  =5 and decreasing for
}  =5=
T h el o w e rc u r v ei nF i g u r e1s h o w s!(}) for two investors and uK = uO = =1, so that there is no
productivity advantage in the high state. The optimal security design is found by aggregating the
component securities for which the net beneﬁt is positive, in this case for (approximately) }  =1
and }  =9= This corresponds to a debt piece with face-value =1 and a call-option piece with strike-
price =9= For low }> there is so little underpricing in the low state that it does not matter that a
lot of capital is raised here. For high }> so little capital is raised in the low state that it does not
matter that the percentage underpricing is high. The total expected underpricing is highest for
intermediate component securities> which are therefore retained by the seller.
F i g u r e1a l s os h o w s!(}) f o rf o u ri n v e s t o r s ,i l l u s t r a t i n gt h ee ect of increasing the degree of
competition. There is no underpricing as long as the second highest bidder gets a high signal, which
is more and more likely as Q goes up. Therefore, as Q increases, expected underpricing goes down
for any component security, so less and less is retained.
Underpricing happens only in the case where the winner gets a high signal and all other bidders
get low signals. Note that as Q goes up, this is a case for which the cash ﬂow is likely to be very low.
Therefore, the relative capital raising beneﬁt of information sensitivity goes up since information
sensitive securities like call options are expected to raise almost none of their capital in this state
and almost all in the state where underpricing is zero. This explains why the call option component
in Figure 1 becomes relatively more important as the degree of competition goes up.
B.2. Underpricing Advantage of Information Sensitivity: General Properties
I now show that the characteristics of the optimal security design in the example hold more generally.
First, it is always optimal to include some debt-component when u is strictly positive, since debt
12can be made virtually risk-free if the face value is low enough. Second, if the signal-distribution
is such that good states have zero underpricing, and if the fraction of winning investors N
Q is
su!ciently small, then an option component should always be included. Third, as Q grows, the
option component becomes a more important part of the security design.
Proposition 2. Suppose the information structure is inherently discrete with a ﬁnite set of distinct
signals,16 and u is independent of ]. Then, the following is true:
1. The optimal ex ante security design always contains a senior debt component: There is
G(u>Q) A 0 such that for all uA0 and number of bidders Q> gz
g} =1for }  G(u>Q)= Also,
G(u>Q) $ } as Q $4 =
2. For a su!ciently large number of bidders Q, the optimal security design also contains a call
option: There is V (u>Q) ? } and P such that for all uA0 and Q  P> gz
g} =1if }  V (u>Q)
or }  G(u>Q)> and gz
g} =0if V (u>Q) A}AG(u>Q)= Also, V (u>Q) $ 0 as Q $4 =
3. For a su!ciently large number of bidders Q, the call option component becomes relatively
more important as the number of bidders grows: For each }> There is a sequence u(Q) A 0
and an P such that for all QAP >we have that V (u(Q)>Q)=} and G(u(Q)>Q) ?} >
where G(u(Q)>Q) $ 0 as Q $4 = Also, u(Q) $ 0 as Q $4 =
Although the assumptions underlying this result do not appear to be very strong, it is worth
noting a few caveats. First, for u held constant, the underpricing for all component securities
goes to zero as Q goes to inﬁnity so that selling the entire asset becomes optimal for large Q.
However, the underpricing for high cash ﬂows goes to zero at a faster rate, which leads to the result
in Proposition 2 that the option-component will dominate as Q grows and u is decreased at the
appropriate rate.
Second, Proposition 2 utilizes the fact that there is little “informational distance” between the
price-setting investor and winning investors when the price-setting investor gets a su!ciently high
signal. However, there are standard distributions where this is not the case. For example, suppose
cash-ﬂow ] is normally distributed and signals are distributed as
[ = ] + %
with %  Q
¡
0>2¢
with % independent of ]= Then, it turns out that the underpricing is not
necessarily decreasing in the pivotal signal, so that information sensitive securities have no capital
13raising advantage. Without this advantage, debt is optimal:
Proposition 3. Suppose u is constant, ] is normally distributed and [ = ] + % with % normally
distributed and independent of ]= Then, debt is optimal for all Q.
B.3. Productivity Advantage of Information Sensitivity
I now study the case where the investment opportunity is correlated with the asset being sold, so
that u(]) is increasing. Now there is an added advantage of raising more capital in high states,
since the productivity of capital is higher in those states. This advantage, in contrast to the cost
advantage discussed above, does not depend on the characteristics of the signal distribution. When
u(]) is increasing, it is easy to see that raising more capital in high states is beneﬁcial if the cost
of underpricing is ignored. Of course, if the cost is taken into account, debt may still be optimal.
However, as the degree of competition increases, underpricing becomes less and less important for
any signal distribution, and hence the beneﬁt advantage of information sensitivity will dominate.
These results are stated formally in the following Proposition:
Proposition 4. If u(]) is increasing, then the (gross) beneﬁt
R
H (u(])|\N+1 = |)t(}||)g| of
selling component security 1]D} is increasing in }= Also, there is an P such that for QAP >the
net beneﬁt !(}) is increasing in }> and if H(u) ? 0 (non-trivial transaction cost) the optimal ex
ante security design is a call option with strike price VA0=
Note that as Q becomes large, underpricing goes to zero, and hence selling the full asset is
optimal if u(]) is everywhere strictly positive. The last part of the proposition therefore deals
with the case where u(]) can be negative. For example, suppose that for each dollar raised in
the auction, there is a brokerage fee f> and that the productivity of capital is proportional to ]
so that u(])=e]  f= If H (u) ? 0> it is not worth issuing a risk-free security, since the expected
productivity of capital will not make up for the brokerage fee. However, an information sensitive
security avoids the fee when productivity of capital is low, and so can be worth issuing.
B.4. Discussion
T h eD e g r e eo fC o m p e t i t i o n : In Propositions 2 and 4, I let the degree of competition in the
auction grow by increasing the number of investors while holding the number of units sold constant.
This means that the fraction of winning investors goes to zero. Another natural experiment is to
14let supply and demand grow together, while keeping the fraction of winning investors constant. It
is easy to show that as the auction becomes large in this way, the underpricing goes to zero (see,
for example, Axelson (2003)). Therefore, Proposition 4 goes through unchanged, since it only relies
on the fact that the cost of information sensitivity disappears as the market becomes competitive.
However, Proposition 2 hinges crucially on the fact that all winning bidders tend to bunch together
at the top of the signal distribution as Q grows. The fraction of winning investors must therefore
be su!ciently small for the result to go through.17
Also, the fraction of winning investor is treated as exogenous. In principle, though, it can
be a choice variable of the ﬁrm. Axelson (2003) and Parlour and Rajan (2001) show that it is
not always optimal to concentrate the allocation to the fewest possible winners in common-value
auctions, even when bidders have linear demand. However, it can be shown that when signals
are distributed according to the assumption in Proposition 2 and the productivity of capital is
constant, it is in fact optimal to minimize the fraction of winning investors to take advantage of
the low underpricing in the tail of the signal distribution. Therefore, if the seller is free to pick N
optimally, the result in Proposition 2 goes through.
Finally, it would be natural to consider the case where the number of investors does not grow,
but the number of signals observed by each investor grows. This would be the case, for example, if
groups of investors can collude and consolidate their bids as the market grows large, or if gathering
information becomes cheaper and investors ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to become better informed. As the
number of signals grows large, the underpricing goes to zero since investors become perfectly in-
formed and information asymmetry goes to zero. Therefore, Proposition 4 will still go through for
this case. Again, however, Proposition 2 does not go through. There are two reasons for this. First,
the fraction of winning investors does not become small as the number of signals increases. Sec-
ond, the distribution of the aggregate signal of a bidder goes towards a normal distribution as the
number of signals becomes large - hence, the cost advantage of information sensitivity disappears.18
The Monotonicity and Limited Liability Constraints: The monotonicity and limited liabil-
ity constraints, which ensure that a security z(}) starts at zero and has a derivative between zero
and one, are important drivers of the shape of the optimal securities. The issuer will typically do
better if they can be relaxed, and sometimes we see examples of this in ﬁnancial markets. For exam-
ple, in asset backed securities markets, issuers sometimes provide some insurance against default of
issued debt, which violates the limited liability assumptions. This makes securities less information
15sensitive and can therefore reduce the informational rents of investors. Similarly, we sometimes see
securities that violate monotonicity. A digital option, which has a discrete jump from paying o
n o t h i n gt op a y i n go  a ﬁxed amount if cash ﬂow of the underlying asset is above a certain cut-o,
is one example. If a ﬁrm has outstanding equity, it can also issue a non-monotonic claim by raising
debt, and use part of the proceeds for a share repurchase. The aggregate issued claim will then be
increasing for low ﬁrm cash ﬂows and decreasing for high cash ﬂows. In a previous version of the
paper, I show that issuing such a claim can result in zero underpricing. The reason for this is that
investors with low and high signals may have the same expected value for a non-monotonic claim,
so that their private information is no longer useful.19
III. Ex Post Security Design
The results above have been derived under the assumption that the ﬁrm has to design the security
without taking any investor information into account. However, there are many issuing strategies
used by ﬁrms in ﬁnancial markets in which the security design is contingent on investor information.
Maybe the simplest example is an auction with a reserve price, where the security is not issued
unless investor signals are high enough to make them bid above the reserve. Another example is
when a ﬁrm issues several securities sequentially, and let the design of later issues be contingent on
the price received in earlier issues.
I now show that if the ﬁrm is allowed to make the security design contingent on investor
information, which I refer to as ex post security design, the beneﬁt of information sensitive securities
disappears and debt becomes optimal. By letting the face value of the debt increase with investor
information, the ﬁrm can replicate the beneﬁcial capital raising characteristics of an information
sensitive security, while still minimizing the amount of underpricing.
A. Sales Mechanism
I model ex post security design as a natural extension of the sealed bid, uniform price auction
in which not only the price but also the security design is allowed to vary with the signal of the
N +1 :st highest bidder. In particular, the sales mechanism works likes this:
1. The ﬁrm sets up a menu of securities z(]>|)> where the issued security will be a function
of the pivotal signal \N+1 = |.
2. In a bookbuilding phase, the ﬁrm collects indications of interest in terms of reported signals
16{b {1>===> b {Q}=
3. The N investors with the highest indications of interest receive an equal allocation of security
z(]>|),w h e r e| is the N +1 :st highest report, at the price  (z>|) d e s c r i b e di nL e m m a1 .
The following proposition shows that it is an equilibrium for investors to report their true signal,
regardless of what the menu of securities is:
Proposition 5. Given any menu z(]>|) that satisﬁes monotonicity and limited liability with
respect to ], it is an equilibrium for all investors to report their signals truthfully.
B. Security Design
From the result in Proposition 5, as long as the sealed bid, uniform pricing rule is used, the ﬁrm is























The optimal security design now only depends on the sign of the conditional net beneﬁt !(}||)=
Since !(}||) is decreasing in }> debt is optimal:
Proposition 6. The optimal ex post security design when \N+1 = | is debt with face value G(|)
determined as follows:
1. If !(0||) ? 0>G (|)=0(nothing is sold)
2. If !(}||)  0>G (|)=} (the whole asset is sold)
3. Otherwise, G(|) is given by the unique solution to !(G(|)||)=0
Thus, when ex post security design is used, a version of the “folklore proposition of debt” holds,
just as in a model of ﬁrm private information. The intuition for the debt result is also similar
in the two models: Underpricing is increasing in information sensitivity, and debt minimizes the
information sensitivity. In fact, at the time of issuance, there is a sense in which the model is
converted into a ﬁrm private information model as the ﬁrm has learnt the investor information in
17the ﬁrst stage of the mechanism. However, the underpricing here is not due to a good ﬁrm being
pooled with bad ﬁrms, but rather from the informational rent that the ﬁrm has to commit to give
out to investors in exchange for stating their signals truthfully in the ﬁrst stage. The two models
also lead to dierent implications about the amount of debt that should be issued as a function of
ﬁrm quality. DeMarzo (2005) shows that a privately informed ﬁrm of higher quality should retain
more (issue less debt) to signal its quality, while in my model a ﬁrm of better quality will often end
up issuing more debt, either because the underpricing is lower (see the example below), or because
the productivity of capital is higher.
The bookbuilding mechanism above may look esoteric, but can encompass variants of issuance
strategies commonly observed in ﬁnancial markets. The following proposition shows two examples
of issuance strategies, using reserve prices and issuing securities sequentially, that can replicate the
outcome of the mechanism:
Proposition 7. Suppose the optimal debt schedule G(|) in Proposition 6 is increasing in |= Then,
the outcome of the mechanism can be implemented by the following two mechanims:
1. Auction of tranches with reserve prices:
• The ﬁrm issues debt tranches of decreasing seniority, which are sold simultaneously in
sealed bid, uniform price, N - unit auctions. Each auction has a reserve price such that
the tranche is only issued if the N +1 :st highest bidder meets the reserve.
2. Sequential Issuance:
• First, the ﬁrm runs a sealed bid, uniform price, N unit auction of senior debt with
face value GV  min|:G(|)A0 G(|)=
• Observing the resulting price  from the ﬁrst auction, the ﬁrm inverts for \N+1 = |
assuming investors bid according to Lemma 1. and sells junior debt with face value
GM (|)  G(|)  GV in a second sealed bid, uniform price, N unit auction.
It is important to note that I am forcing the mechanims to be within the class of sealed bid, N
- unit, uniform price auctions, even though this may not be optimal for the seller. For example, in
the dynamic implementation strategy, I do not allow a winner in the ﬁrst auction to be excluded in
the second, or any release of information other than the pivotal signal between the two auctions.
18I discuss the extent to which the security design results may generalize to other choices of sales
mechanisms in Section IV.
B.1. Example continued
Going back to the example developed in Section IIB.1, I now show how to derive the optimal ex
post security design. It is optimal to sell the whole asset when both investors have high signals







since this sets !(G(Low)|Low)=0 = The optimal debt-level is increasing in the productivity of
capital u= Also, note that the debt-level is lower when the pivotal signal is low, reﬂecting the higher
underpricing.
The optimal schedule can be implemented with the strategies described in Proposition 7. With
the sequential issuance strategy, the ﬁrst security to issue is senior debt with face-value G(Low).
This is sold in a standard uniform price auction. After deducing the pivotal signal | from this






if \N+1 = High.
Alternatively, the ﬁrm could sell the securities in two simultaneous auctions. In one auction,
the senior debt component is sold. In the second auction, the junior debt component is sold with
ar e s e r v ep r i c eo fH (min(GM>max(]  G(low)>0)|\N = \N+1 = High)=
IV. Discussion: Other Sales Mechanisms
For simplicity, the security design results have been derived taking as given the sealed bid uniform
price auction format. This is not necessarily an innocuous restriction. I now discuss how the
security design results may be aected when other sales mechanisms are used.
The key ex ante security design results in Propositions 2 and 4 about the beneﬁt of information
sensitivity rely on two conditions: That information sensitive securities raise relatively more capital
in “good” states, and that the net beneﬁt of capital raising may be higher in good states. Both these
19conditions are satisﬁed for other standard auction formats such as the sealed bid discriminatory
price auction and the open ascending price auction.
The open ascending price auction is of particular interest as it generates the highest expected
revenues of the three standard auction formats (while the discriminatory price auction generates
the lowest expected revenues). In an ascending price auction, the price is raised gradually until all
but N bidders remain. As bidders drop out, their signals can be inferred from the price they drop
out at. The equilibrium price in an ascending price auction is exactly the same as the price in a
sealed bid uniform price auction, except that it depends on the signals of all losing bidders:
(z>|N+1>===>| Q)=H (z|\N = \N+1 = |N+1>===>\ Q = |Q)
The nature of the underpricing is also the same - the price underestimates the signal of the marginal
winner. One can show that the ex ante security design results in Propositions 2 and 4 and the ex
post security design result in Proposition 6 can be extended to this case.
It is beyond the scope of the paper to answer the question of what the optimal sales mechanism
is. However, for the speciﬁc distributional assumptions made in the examples above, it can be
shown that a version of the ascending price auction which gives the entire allocation to the highest
bidder (N =1 ) is optimal among mechanisms that satisfy certain robustness conditions, such as
an ex post individual rationality condition that allows investors to refuse an allocation after the
price is observed. For this special case, the security design results in Propositions 2, 4 and 6 go
through.20 The intuition for why the ascending price auction generates higher revenues and why
the entire allocation should be given to the highest bidder is related to the well-known linkage
principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982b), which states that the more information is used for setting
the price (and in this paper, designing the security), the higher revenues will be. The ascending
price auction links the price to the information of all loosing bidders; Allocating everything to the
highest bidder means that all but one investor signal is utilized. The ascending price auction can
be viewed as a dynamic version of the sealed bid auction, and is in fact sometimes the optimal
dynamic mechanism.
Although the security design results appear to hold for the standard, robust sales mechanisms
discussed above, they can change dramatically if more general mechanisms are allowed. For a
common value setting such as the one in this paper, Crémer and McLean (1985) have shown that
a seller can design an interim incentive compatible mechanism where all surplus is extracted from
20investors independent of the security design used. Thus, the security design becomes irrelevant.
Although this is a disturbing result, the mechanisms required involve unattractive features that are
not commonly observed in ﬁnancial markets, such as large payments from losing investors.
V. Extensions
A. The Multiple Asset Case
The previous analysis assumed that bidders only have private information about one asset or one
factor aecting the cash ﬂow distribution. I now turn to the case where the seller is endowed with
multiple assets. The security design now involves two steps: First, the seller partitions the assets
into pools. Then, he issues a security for each pool backed by the pool cash-ﬂow.21 In particular,
suppose the seller has L assets to sell, and that the cash-ﬂow of asset l is given by
]l = 0 + l l =1 >===>L
where 0 is a systematic factor common to all assets and l is an unsystematic factor. Further,
to make the analysis tractable, I make the following distributional assumptions:
Assumption A1 :
• Factors l are independently identically distributed random variables with distribution
function J(!)=
• Investors get conditionally independent signals Xql 5 {0>1} about each factor where
S (Xql =1 |l = !) is increasing in !=
This assumption makes it possible to collapse the multi-dimensional signal investors get about
idiosyncratic factors in a pool into a one-dimensional signal (basically, the sum of his signals about
each factor).22
The following proposition shows that debt backed by a pool of assets tends to be the optimal
design when the number of assets is large enough.
Proposition 8. (Optimal pooling when the number of assets is large):
1. If there is no systematic factor there is a M such that for all number of assets LAM >the
optimal ex post and ex ante security design is debt backed by the whole pool of assets.
212. If there is a systematic factor, as the number of assets L $4, pooling dominates indi-
vidual sales, and the optimal pool-backed security design is given by a senior debt compo-
nent min(]>G) plus a component z(max(]  G>0))> where z is the optimal security design
backed by only the systematic factor 0.
The eect of pooling is similar to the eect of issuing debt: It makes the security less sensitive
to information, since high and low signals tend to cancel out in a large pool. As is shown in Axelson
(2003), pooling without any retention of cash-ﬂows is always beneﬁcial if the number of assets is
large enough, even under much more general distributional assumptions than I have made here.
Case 1 of the proposition shows that the seller can do even better by issuing debt and retain
the riskiest cash ﬂows in the pool. The reason is simple: Component securities 1]D} with a cut-o
value below the mean become less and less risky the more assets are in the pool; Hence, they feature
little underpricing and should be sold. This is not true for component securities that pay o only if
the average pool cash-ﬂow is above the mean; they become very risky, are underpriced, and should
be retained. Note that debt becomes optimal even when a more information sensitive security is
the optimal security backing a single asset.
When there is systematic risk, pooling is still optimal because it lowers underpricing created
by unsystematic factors. However, the optimal security design does not necessarily consist of debt
exclusively. A senior debt component will always be issued, since the cash-ﬂow from the average
unsystematic factors becomes virtually risk-free and should be sold. However, the systematic factor
is not diversiﬁed in the pool. The optimal security design should therefore also consist of a piece
that looks like the optimal security issued if the systematic factor was the only asset.23
Proposition 8 is concerned with the case where the number of assets is large, especially relative
to the number of bidders. It can be shown that for some signal distributions, such as the normal
distribution, pooling is beneﬁcial for as little as two assets, and for any degree of competition.
However, this is not true for the discrete signal distribution I have assumed here. The following
proposition shows that when the signal distribution is discrete and the degree of competition is high
enough, information sensitive securities backed by individual assets is the optimal security design.
Proposition 9. Suppose there is no systematic factor. Then, there exists an P such that for all
number of investors QAP >individual sales are optimal and the optimal ex ante security design
is to issue information sensitive securities as given in Proposition 2.
When the information structure is discrete, there is no underpricing when the pivotal bidder gets
22the highest possible signal about a pool, since winning investors cannot have better information.
The fewer assets there are in the pool, the more likely this scenario is since there are fewer assets
to get a high signal about. This is what drives the result that separate sales can be preferrable
to pooling. For this eect to be important, the fraction of winning investors has to be su!ciently
small, since the pivotal bidder is then more likely to come from the top of the distribution. The more
competitive the setting, the more the capital raising becomes tilted towards this low underpricing
state, making the eect even stronger. For su!ciently high Q> separate sales are always optimal.
From Proposition 2, we also know that information sensitive securities are optimal under the same
circumstances, which explains the last part of Proposition 9.24
There are two indicative results to be gleaned from the propositions above. First, the pooling
decision and the security design decision are linked. When pooling is optimal, debt also tends
to be optimal, and when separate sales are optimal, more information sensitive securities tend to
be optimal. Second, the choice of security design depends on the number of assets relative to the
degree of competition. If the number of assets is large relative to the degree of competition, pooling
with debt is optimal. If the opposite holds, separate sales with information sensitive securities can
be optimal.
B. Project-Backed Securities
For analytical and expositional simplicity, I have assumed that the asset ] being sold is pre-existing
and that its cashﬂow is not aected by the investment of the ﬁrm. This rules out the important
case in corporate ﬁnance where capital for investment is raised by issuing a security backed by
cash-ﬂows from the investment itself. I now show that the ﬂavor of most results in the paper go
through for this case as well.
Suppose that investors now get signals about a factor  (where signals satisfy MLRP with re-
spect to the factor), and that ] denotes the cash-ﬂow from a new investment opportunity. Speciﬁ-
cally, if the ﬁrm invests L in the project, it pays o T(L>) in period one with T strictly increasing






The ﬁrst assumption requires that the investment is decreasing returns to scale, as opposed to the
23previous analysis. This is necessary to assure that the maximization problem is well speciﬁed. The
second assumption says that the marginal returns to investment is non-decreasing in the state.
Also, I assume that there is a (possibly very small) proportional capital raising cost f for each
dollar raised. Furthermore, if the ﬁrm raises  dollars and invests less than the full amount in the
project, the remaining  (1  f)  L is put in a risk-free asset. This gives the cash-ﬂow backing
securities as
] = T(L>)+(1  f)  L
As investors bid, they must now take into account that the amount raised and the investment
policy of the ﬁrm will aect the value of their securities. I assume that the ﬁrm can commit ex
ante to an investment policy as a function of the price setting signal \N+1.25
It is easy to show that the equilibrium pricing function from Lemma 1 will still hold. The
maximization problem of the ﬁrm can then be expressed as
max
L(|)>z(]>|)
H (]  z(]>|))
such that
(z(]>|)>|)=H (z(]>|)|\N = \N+1 = |)
L (|)  (z(]>|)>|)(1 f)
The following proposition shows that debt is still optimal in the ex post security design problem.
Proposition 10. The optimal ex post security design is to issue debt with face value G(|)=
Everything is invested in the project and nothing in the risk-free asset, and the investment level
L (|) is below the ﬁrst best.
That the investment level is below the ﬁrst best is intuitive, since the ﬁrm suers both under-
pricing and a transaction cost f when raising capital. A positive transaction cost also assures that
the ﬁrm is better o not raising any extra funds on top of what is needed for investment. If the
transaction cost were zero, the ﬁrm would be indierent between raising extra funds or not.
In the ex ante security design problem, information sensitive securities can be optimal since
they tend to raise more capital when the investment opportunity is more valuable. I show this by
way of an example.
24Suppose the investment opportunity is given by a decreasing returns to scale technology:
T(L>)=L
for ?1= Then, if the ﬁrm can raise capital at a transaction cost f per dollar but with no
underpricing, the ﬁrst best amount raised given a state \N+1 = | is calculated as
W (|)=







H (]|\N+1 = |)
where expected cash ﬂow H (]|\N+1 = |) is calculated by setting ] = T(W (|)>)= Now, suppose
the ﬁrm issues straight equity z(])= 






]|\N = \N+1 = |
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Notice that as Q $4 > underpricing disappears, and (|) $ W (|)> and hence for high degree of
competition, straight equity is indeed the optimal security design. Any other security would either
raise too much capital in some contingencies, leading to unnecessary transaction costs, or too little,
leading to too low an investment level. An empirical implication of this is that a ﬁrm that ﬁnances
growth opportunities with high uncertainty should issue equity instead of debt, which lines up with
the behavior of young growth ﬁrms.
With lower levels of competition, underpricing would play a role in determining the optimal
security design, and so the characteristics of the signal distribution would become important.
The optimality of information sensitivity in this example relied on the characteristics of the
production function. In particular, when investors have good information, proportionately more
should be invested, and straight equity has exactly that characteristic. One can show that if
the required investment amount to undertake the project is ﬁxed, there is no need to introduce
information sensitivity, and debt is optimal.
VI. Conclusion
I have developed a theory of security design in which investors have private information about the
prospects of a ﬁrm. In raising capital for investment, the ﬁrm chooses the form of the securities
25to minimize private information rents of investors while assuring that the right amount of capital
is raised. If the ﬁrm has to set the security design in advance, information sensitive securities
like equity can become optimal. This is especially true as the degree of competition increases.
The beneﬁt of information sensitive securities is that they often raise relatively more capital in
states where capital is more valuable, and in states where underpricing is smaller. The cost of an
information sensitivite security is that the relative underpricing in any state is higher than for debt.
If the ﬁrm is able to make the face value su!ciently contingent on investors’ indication of
interest, for example by issuing several securities with dierent reserve prices or sequentially issuing
securities, I show that debt is optimal.
In the multiple asset case, I show that debt backed by pooling is often an optimal security
design when the number of assets is large relative to the number of bidders, while equity backed
by individual assets can become optimal as the degree of competition increases.
It is worth pointing out a few limitations of the analysis. Just as the signalling literature
completely ignores private information on the side of investors, this paper completely ignores private
information held by the ﬁrm. The truth probably lies somewhere in between, and it would be a
natural next step to analyse the double-sided private information problem. Unfortunately, treating
both signalling and screening in the same model is challenging, and it is far from obvious how the
analysis in this paper can be extended to that case.
Another limitation is that I have assumed that the ﬁrm rather than investors has the power
to design securities. Even though I show that the optimal debt menu can be implemented when
I allow investors to propose the security design within the speciﬁc format outlined in Section III,
this result may not be robust to more general mechanisms. For example, DeMarzo, Kremer, and
Skrzypacz (2003) show within an independent signals framework that the security design ﬂips from
debt to a call option when investors suggest securities and the ﬁrm cannot commit not to accept
the best oer ex post. Interestingly, in a recent paper, Inderst and Mueller (2003) show that when
the informed investor has monopoly power and designs the securities, the opposite holds and debt
is optimal if the investor must leave the ﬁrm with some ﬁxed ex ante reservation utility. It would
be useful to have a more general theory that delineates exactly how the bargaining power of the
ﬁrm and investors aects the security design.
These limitations notwithstanding, the results of the model are broadly consistent with observed
patterns of security design. For example, the prediction that a large asset base should be sold
through debt issues backed by a pool is consistent with securitization patterns in the asset-backed
26securities markets, while equity issues are more prevalent when the asset base is more focused (as
is the case for individual ﬁrms).
The theory developed here may also be applied to analyze a variety of other phenomena. For
example, the results have implications for the life cycle patterns in the ﬁnancing of a ﬁrm. A
feature of the theory is that it can provide an explanation for both debt and equity within the
same framework, and provides conditions under which we would expect to observe one rather than
the other. In the life cycle of a ﬁrm we might expect the degree of competition among investors
and the availability of information about the company to be smaller at early stages, leading to a
preference for debt securities. As the company grows older, information is more widely accessible,
and more investors have their eyes on the company. At this stage it is possible for the company to
issue equity through an IPO.
Similarly, it is possible to explain why dierent ﬁnancial systems seem to favor dierent types
of securities. In a bank oriented system with little capital market competition for the ﬁnancing of
companies, debt should be more prevalent. In a stock market based system, information acquisi-
tion is cheaper and the pool of investors larger, which makes it easier to issue equity. Improved
information technology and increased investor participation in stock markets would also lead to an
increased propensity of ﬁrms to issue equity at an earlier stage of the company life cycle. The in-
creased fraction of young ﬁrms in stock markets, both in the US and in Europe, may be a reﬂection
of this development, as is the decreased fraction of large diversiﬁed conglomerates.
Finally, the theory suggests a role for ﬁnancial intermediation. As was shown in Proposition
8, having access to a large number of assets can reduce the underpricing per asset by allowing the
seller to construct pooled securities. If a seller has access to only a single asset, there is room
for a ﬁnancial intermediary to step in and synthesize pooling by bringing together assets of many
sellers and ﬁnance them through a pooled issue.26 When information acquisition costs are high, we
would expect such intermediation to arise endogenously. Similarly, the theory would predict that
as information acquisition costs in the economy go down, we would expect to see disintermediation
as single asset sales become more beneﬁcial. A more detailed investigation of these issues is left for
future research.
27Appendix A. Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
See (Pesendorfer and Swinkels, 1997) for a full proof. A sketch of the proof is as follows. The
postulated equilibrium bid for an investor with signal { is
e({)=H (z|\N = \N+1 = {)
which is increasing in { from the MLRP assumption. I show that there is no incentive for a
bidder to deviate from this strategy even after learning the realization of the price setting signal
\N = |N and \N+1 = |N+1> so it must be an optimal strategy ex ante. The expected pay o for
an investor with {A| N+1 under the equilibrium strategy is
H (z|[ = {A\ N+1 = |N+1)  H (z|\N = \N+1 = |N+1)
Note that this is positive and is independent of the bid of the investor as long as he wins. Thus, the
investor is happy to follow the prescribed equilibrium when he is among the winning bidders. Now
suppose he is among loosing bidders if he bids according to the equilibrium, so that his pay o is
zero. If he deviates by increasing his bid so that he wins, the price will be set by the bidder with
the N:th highest signal instead. Suppose \N = |N  |N. The expected pay o of the investor is
H (z|\N = |N  \N+1 = |A[= {)  H (z|\N = \N+1 = |N)
This is non-positive. Therefore, there is no incentive to deviate.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
Monotonicity together with the assumption of a continuous distribution for ] implies that
z(}>|) is continuous, since any jump down (up) would violate monotonicity of z(}>|) (}z(}>|)).
Thus,
gz(}>|)
g} exists. There may be kinks in z(}>|) in which case
gz(}>|)
g} is taken to be the left
derivative:
gz(}>|)
g} =l i m }0}
z(}>|)3z(}0>|)
}3}0 . Given the existence of
gz(}>|)
g} , monotonicity is then
equivalent to requiring
gz(}>|)
g} 5 [0>1]. Limited liability implies z(0>|)=0 . Given the bound on
gz(}>|)
g} , limited liability is then guaranteed for all }.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :
First, I show that !(} ||) depends on } only through the hazard rate
13I(||})
i(||}) , and then I show
28that the hazard rate is increasing in }:
!(} ||)=H (u|\N+1 = |) 
H (1]D}|\N+1 = |)   (1]D}>|)
(1]D}>|)
= H (u|\N+1 = |) 
S (]  } |\N+1 = |)  S (]  } |\N+1 = \N = |)
S (]  } |\N+1 = \N = |)
We have that
S (]  } |\N+1 = |)








so that !(} ||) depends on } through the term

R }
} i (\N+1 = ||y)j(y)gy
R }
} i (\N+1 = \N = ||y)j (y)gy
Note that !(} ||) is continuous in }= The derivative of the expression above with respect to } is
equal to
R }
} (i (\N+1 = ||})i (\N+1 = \N = ||y)  i (\N+1 = \N = ||})i (\N+1 = ||y))j (y)gy
³R }
} i (\N+1 = \N = ||y)j (y)gy
´2
Note that




N  1!(Q  N  1)!
i (||y)
2 (1  I (||y))
N31 I (||y)
Q3N31
i (\N+1 = ||y)=
Q!
N!(Q  N  1)!
i (||y)(1 I (||y))
N I (||y)
Q3N31
Therefore, we have that
i (\N = \N+1 = ||y)=F 
i (||y)
1  I (||y)
i (\N+1 = ||y)
for some positive constant F that does not depend on y= Hence,
Z 1
}






1  I (||y)

i (||})
1  I (||})
¶
i (\N+1 = ||y)i (\N+1 = ||})j (y)gy
If I show that
i(||})




13I(||}) is negative for yA} ,
29and hence the expression above is non-positive, which proves that !(} ||) is decreasing in }.T o
show this, note that the inverse of
i(||})
13I(||}) is the hazard rate
13I(||})
i(||}) which is given by:








Note that this is increasing in } from MLRP. Therefore,
i(||})
13I(||}) is decreasing in }.A l s on o t et h e
following properties:
1. For all }>!(} ||) is strictly increasing in } at some | since the MLRP inequality holds strictly
at least for some {>{0 such that {A{ 0=
2. !(} ||) is constant in } for all } if and only if there exists no |0 A|such that the MLRP
inequality holds strictly for some pair }>}0=
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :
I show that the derivative of
t(}||)











 (1]D}>|)j (}|\N+1 = |)









































For }A} 0> we have  (1]D}0>|) A(1]D}>|)= Also, from MLRP,
j(y|\N+1=|)
j(}|\N+1=|) is increasing in | for
yA}and decreasing in | for y?} =Hence, the term is positive.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
The result follows immediately if I can show that the following claims are true:
301. ! is continuous with !(0) = u and for any }A0>!(}) ?u =
2. For any }A0> there is an P (}) such that !(y) is strictly increasing for all y  }, Q  P
3. u  !(}) $ 0 as Q $4 =
Claim 1 shows that some debt with face value larger than zero is always optimal, since ! is
strictly positive at 0 and is continuous, so that there exists GA0 such that !(})  0 for }  G.
Claim 2 shows that if u(Q)=!(}) for some }A0 and QAP(})> then a call option component
with strike price } is also optimal to include. Also, for any }0 such that 0 ?} 0 ?} ,f o rQAP (}0)
and u(Q)=!(})> all component securities 1]Dy where }0  yA}should be retained. Hence, as
Q $4 > the debt component becomes negligible. Claim 3 shows that u(Q) $ 0=
For any discrete ﬁnite signal structure, denote each distinct signal with an integer from 0 to K,
and in the continuous representation let the highest equivalence interval be [K>K +1 )= Note that

















S (]  } |\N+1 = |)




P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :
That !(0) = u follows from the expression above since S (]  0|\N+1 = |)=S (]  } |\N = \N+1 = |)=
1. Also, since MLRP holds strictly for signals in dierent equivalence interval, !(}||) is strictly
decreasing in } for all |?Kas shown in Lemma 3 Hence, !(}) ?ufor all }A0= That !(}) is
continuous follows since both !(}||) and t(}||) are continuous in }=
P r o o fo fC l a i m s2a n d3 :
First, note that for | 5 [K>K +1 ) (the marginal loser has the highest possible signal) we
have !(}||) constant in } as was shown in Lemma 3. Hence, !(}||)=u for |  K (there is no





S (]  } |\N+1 = |)




31I ﬁrst show that for all }A0 and |?K >we have
S(]D}|\N+1=|)
S(]D}|\N=\N+1=|)  1 5 [d1>d 2] for constants
0 ?d 1  d2 ? 4 independent of the number of bidders. Hence, we have that u!(}) goes to zero
with
R K
|=0 t(}||)g|. I show this as follows:
S (]  } |\N+1 = |)
S (]  } |\N = \N+1 = |)
=
R }
} j (y|\N+1 = |)gy
R }
} j (y|\N = \N+1 = |)gy
=
ÃR }
0 i (\N = \N+1 = ||] = y)j(y)gy
R }
0 i (\N+1 = ||] = y)j (y)gy
!Ã R }
} i (\N+1 = ||] = y)j (y)gy
R }
} i (\N = \N+1 = ||] = y)j(y)gy
!
where the second step follows from Bayes’ Law. We have that
R }
} i (\N+1 = ||] = y)j (y)gy
R }














2 (1  I (||y))
N31 I (||y)
Q3N31 j (y)gy
Divide numerator and denominator by I (||})

























1  I (||})
i (||})
This follows since I (||}) is strictly decreasing in } from MLRP. Therefore, as Q $4 ,w eh a v e
that
S(]D}|\N+1=|)




13I(||0)  1. Since the hazard rate
13I(||})
i(||}) is strictly
increasing in } for |?K , this is bounded and strictly bigger than zero for all }A0. Hence,









} i (\N+1 = \N = ||] = y)j (y)gy
H ((1]D}>\ N+1))
Note that the unconditional expected price in the numerator goes to the true unconditional value
of the security (see, for example, (Pesendorfer and Swinkels, 1997)) which is a positive constant.
32Hence,
R K














N  1!(Q  N  1)!
i (||y)
2 (1  I (||y))
N31 I (||y)
Q3N31 j (y)gyg|
Note that I (||}) is strictly decreasing in } from MLRP. Dividing the above by I (K |} + %)
Q3N31
for some %A0 the integral goes to inﬁnity as Q goes to inﬁnity. Dividing by I (K |}  %)
Q3N31,
the integral goes to zero. Since % was arbitrary, we must have that !(}) goes to zero at a rate
proportional to I (K |})
Q3N31 = (Note that I have not pinpointed the exact convergence rate; all I
need is that u!(}) goes to zero faster for a higher }=). Since I (K |}) is decreasing in },w eh a v e
that
u3!(})
u3!(}0) goes to inﬁnity with Q for }0 A}A0. Hence, for any }A0, !(y) becomes decreasing
for all yA}as Q $4 . This proves Claims 2 and 3, and hence the Proposition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
We have u  !(}) given as
1  J(})
H(1  J(}|\N = \N+1 = |))
 1
I show that the derivative of this w.r.t. } is non-negative, which proves the result. The derivative
is given by
H(j(}|\N = \N+1 = |))(1  J(}))  j (})H(1  J(}|\N = \N+1 = |)
[H(1  J(}|\N = \N+1 = |))]
2




(j (}|\N = \N+1 = |)j (y)  j(})j(y|\N = \N+1 = |))i (\N+1 = |)g|gy (A.1)
Using that
j(}|\N = \N+1 = |)j(y)
=
(1  I (||}))
N31 i (||})
2 I (||})
Q3N31 j (y)j (})
R








































for d(|) given as
d(|) 
R 13I(||y)











1  I (||])
i (||])
|\N = \N+1 = |
¶
Suppose d(|) is constant. Then, expression A.2 becomes
Z
\N+1









(1  I (||y)
N31 i (||y)
2 I (||y)
Q3N31 |y  }
´
g| =0
This follows since the signal distribution is symmetric around }
Now, if d(|) is decreasing, expression A.2 is positive, since the second term is higher for higher
|= It remains to show that d(|) is decreasing. It is enough to show that for |A| 0,
j (}||)
j(}  (|  |0)||0)
is decreasing in }; that is, if you observe a higher |> you put relatively high weight on } lower than
34|= If this is true, since
13I(||})
i(||}) is increasing in }> d(|) will be decreasing in |= We have that
j(}||)






But note from the symmetry of | around } that i (||})=i (|0|}  (|  |0))= Therefore, we get
j (}||)
j(}  (|  |0)||0)
=
j(})
j(}  (|  |0))
R









The second ratio is independent of }; hence, we can drop it. We get
j (})





















But this is indeed decreasing in }=
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
To show the ﬁrst part of the Proposition, I show that
R
H (u|\N+1 = |)(t(}||)  t(}0||))g| is






Also, from Lemma 4, t(}||)t(}0||) ? 0 if |?| W and t(}||) At(}0||) if |A| W for some |W= We
35have
Z


























Also, as Q $4 > expected underpricing goes to zero as is shown in, for example, Kremer (2002).
Thus, !(}) $
R
H (u|\N+1)t(}||)g|> which is increasing in }.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
R
H (u|\N+1)t(0||)g| =
H (u) ? 0> so the optimal security is a call option with strike price larger than 0=
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :





(H (z(]>|)|[ = {>\N:Q31 = |)  H (z(]>|)|\N = \N+1 = |))i (\N:Q31 = ||[ = {)g{
where {0 is his reported signal, and \N:Q31 is the K:th order statistic among his Q 1 opponents.
Since the integrand is positive for |?{and negative for |A{ , truth-telling is the optimal
strategy.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :
The proof follows immediately from Lemma 3 and the discussion in the text.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :
1. Auction of tranches with reserve prices:
First, look at the auctioning of a single security z with a reserve price u= I ﬁrst show that the
equilibrium bidding strategies postulated in the proof of Lemma 1 are unchanged. The postulated
bidding strategy is
e(z>{)=H (z|\N+1 = \N = {)
The reserve price deﬁnes a cut-o signal \N+1 = |W below which the security is not issued:
e(z>|W)=u
Suppose an investor with signal [ = { bids according to the equilibrium. If his signal is among
36the N highest, and \N+1 = |, his expected pay o is
(H (z|[ = {A\ N+1 = |)  H (z|\N = \N+1 = |))  1|D|W
Note that this is positive and is independent of the bid of the investor. Thus, the investor is happy
to follow the prescribed equilibrium when he is among the winning bidders. Now suppose he would
have been among loosing bidders if he bid according to the equilibrium, but deviates by increasing
his bid and wins when {?\ N= Then, the price will be set by the bidder with the N:th highest
signal instead, and the expected pay o of the investor is
(H (z|[ = {?\ N = |)  H (z|\N = \N+1 = |))  1|D|W
This is negative. Therefore, there is no incentive to deviate. Note also that the price is the same
as before whenever the reserve is met. Finally, note that if several such securities are auctioned
simultaneously, the equilibrium is unaected.
Now suppose the ﬁrm issues P tranches with decreasing seniority, so that tranche p with face
value Gp is deﬁned by









Also, suppose the reserve price up for each tranche is set such that the cut-o signal \N+1 = |W
p
deﬁned above is increasing in p= Suppose these tranches are auctioned simultaneously. Then, for a
certain realization \N+1 = |> all tranches p?p W and no tranches p  pW will be issued, where
































|\N = \N+1 = |
!
37which is the equivalent outcome of selling debt with face value
PpW31
p=1 Gp=
Since G(|) was assumed to be increasing, by issuing enough tranches and setting the reserve
prices the right way, the outcome of the optimal debt schedule in the book builiding mechanism
can be implemented.
2. Sequential Issuance:
I ﬁrst show that the equilibrium bidding strategies postulated in the proof of Lemma 1 are
unchanged in both auctions in the sequence. Look at deviations in the last stage. Under the
equilibrium strategy, the previous auctions have revealed \N+1 = |= However, the bidding strategy
is optimal even contingent on knowing \N+1 = |> as is seen in the proof of Proposition 5, so it is
still an equilibrium regardless of what price was observed in the ﬁrst stage.
Now look at deviations in the ﬁrst stage. Since an action in this stage will not impact the
pricing in the second stage, there is no incentive to deviate from the static equilibrium to aect
prices. However, a deviation could aect the pick of security in the second stage. In the second
stage, if junior debt with face value GM is issued, a winning investor with signal { has expected pay
o
H (min(GM>max(]  GV>0))|[ = {A\ N+1 = |)H (min(GM>max(]  GV>0))|\N = \N+1 = |)
Note that this is positive and increasing in GM= Since GM = G(|0)G(low)> where |0 is the inferred
value of \N+1 from the ﬁrst auction, investors with signal {A|would prefer a higher inferred |0.
However, an investor with {A|cannot increase the perceived |0 in the ﬁrst stage by deviating
from the equilbrium strategy, since increasing his bid does not change the price. An investor who
would loose under the equilbrium strategy in the ﬁrst stage will loose in the second stage and get
pay o zero, so he has no incentive to deviate in the ﬁrst stage by increasing the price. Thus, the
static equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage.
Since this is the case, the ﬁrm will be able to invert for \N+1 = | from the price in the ﬁrst
stage, and will be able to set GM as postulated in the proposition. This replicates the outcome of
the book building mechanism.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :
For this and all other proofs in this section, I start by establishing the following aggregation
result:










where Xq is a uniform random variable on [0>1]. Then, equilibrium and underpricing in the auction
of an admissible security z(]) are given as in Proposition 5 using [q as the one dimensional signal
observed by bidder q.
Proof. Following Milgrom and Weber (1982a), I say that the random variables in the vector d











where d b d0 denotes the component-wise maximum of d and d0and d a d0 denotes the component-
wise minimum. A function i is a!liated if it satisﬁes A.3. I need to show that [q is a su!cient
statistic for z(]), and that the variables {[1>===>[ Q>1>===>L} are a!liated. Using Theorem 5
from Milgrom and Weber, one can then show that H
¡
z
¯ ¯[q = {>\ 3q
N = |
¢
is increasing in { and
|,w h i c hi ss u !cient for the equilibrium in Proposition 5 to be valid.
It is easy to show that [q is a su!cient statistic for ] using the formal deﬁnition of a su!cient
statistic27, but it is also obvious from the symmetry of signals and assets: To predict ] it doesn’t
matter for which assets you got a high signal, only how many high signals you got (that is, [q).
Since z(]) is a deterministic functions of ], [q is therefore also a su!cient statistic for signals
about z(]).
It remains to show that i ({1>===>{ Q>! 1>===>! L)  i ([1 = {1>===>[ Q = {Q>1 = !1>===>L = !L)
is a!liated. I can write the density as .i ({1>===>{ Q>! 1>===>! L)=i ({1 |!1>===>! L )===i ({Q |!1>===>! L )
j (!1)  ===  j(!L)> since signals are conditionally independent and assets are independent. From
Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Weber (1982a), it is enough to show that all functions in this product
are a!liated. This holds trivially for j (!), so all I need to show is that i ({q |!1>===>! L ) is a!liated.
39It is enough to show that for {0
q in a higher equivalence interval than {q and for !l A! 0
l,w eh a v e












i ({q |!1>===>! l>===>! L )
for all l. From the symmetry of assets, it is enough to show this for !1,o rt h a t
i ({q +1|!1>===>! L )
i ({q |!1>===>! L )
is increasing in !1. I show this by induction. That is, if it holds for !1>===>! l> it also holds for
!1>===>! l>! 0 for some extra arbitrary component !0.N o t et h a t
i ({q |!1>===>!L )=i ({q |!2>===>! L )  S (0|!1)+i ({q  1|!2>===>! L )  S (1|!1)
so
i ({q +1|!1>===>! L )
i ({q |!1>===>! L )
=
i ({q +1|!2>===>!L )  S (0|!1)+i ({q |!2>===>! L )  S (1|!1)











That this is increasing in !2>===>! L is implied by the induction hypothesis. Since !1 was arbitrary,
it is increasing in all !’s. Thus it holds for all {q between 1 and L  2= I just need to check that it
also holds for {q =0and {q = L  1. To this purpose, note that:
i (L |!1>===>! L )
















i (1|!1>===>! L )

















S(0|!l ) is increasing in !l, both of these are increasing in !l for all l and we are done.








L . Asymptotically, the distribution of ] 
s
LH(]l) is normal with zero









also reaches a non-degenerate asymptotic normal distribution, both




will therefore be associated with a certain ﬁxed amount of underpricing FA0. When selling the
whole asset pool, the underpricing therefore grows at rate
s
L with L (since the whole pool of assets
consists of
s
L such securities with ﬁxed underpricing). The underpricing per asset in the pool goes
to zero, so this dominates separate sales. That debt is optimal follows from Proposition 3.
To prove the second part of Proposition 8, I start by establishing the optimal security design
if the entire pool is issued. Thus, look at the problem of selling L identical securities backed by
the normalized pool of assets ] =
SL
l=1 ]l
L .A sL goes to inﬁnity, we have that
SL
l=1 xl
L $ H (l)=
Thus, ] $ 0 +H (l)= Then, !(}) $ u for all }  H (l)> so that it is always optimal to include
a senior debt component. The remaining cash-ﬂow ]  H (l)=0> so that the optimal security
design of the remaining cash ﬂow will be identical to the single asset problem where 0 is the asset.
It remains to show that this is better than selling securities backed by individual assets. Suppose
L securities backed by individual assets are sold. From the linkage principle in Milgrom and Weber
(1982a), we know that revealing any information a!liated with the value of the security being sold
prior to the auction increases revenues. Thus, for any security design, suppose the true value of each
unsystematic component is revealed prior to the auction. This increases revenues. Now suppose
furthermore the security design is allowed to be done after the information has been revealed. This
increases revenues even further. For this case, the optimal security design in the sale of asset l when
l = !l w i l lb et oi s s u es e n i o rd e b tw i t hf a c ev a l u e!l, and for the remaining cash ﬂow 0 issue the
optimal single asset security. Aggregating across assets, this policy yields exactly the same revenue
as for the pool as L $4 , and hence the pool dominates separate sales.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 :
The beginning of this proof is identical to the proof of Claims 2 and 3 of Proposition 2 except for
the derivation of the limit of
S(]D}|\N+1=|)
S(]D}|\N=\N+1=|). I now have to condition on a vector of realizations
{yl} instead of a scalar },w h e r e{yl}  {y1>===>y M} is the vector of components that make up a
41certain pool. We now have that
R }
} i (\N+1 = ||y)j(y)gy
R }

























ylD} denotes a multiple integration over all asset vectors that sum up to at least
}.28 Deﬁne the function Imax (|>}) as Imax (|>})  argmax{yl}:
S
yl=} I (||{yl}),w i t ha s s o c i a t e d
“density” imax (|>}) deﬁned as imax (|>})  i (||argmax(Imax (|>}))).S i n c e I (||{yl}) is de-
creasing in each yl, Imax (|>}) is strictly decreasing in }. Divide numerator and denominator of
the expression above by Imax (|>})





























1  Imax (|>})
imax (|>})






imax(|>}) 1. Since the haz-
ard rate
13I(||{yl})
i(||{yl}) is strictly increasing in each yl for |?K , and since argmax{yl}:
S
yl=} I (||{yl}) A









ylD} i (\N+1 = \N = ||{yl})g{yl}
H ( (1]D}>\ N+1))
where again the unconditional expected price in the denominator goes to a positive constant. Hence,
R K
















N  1!(Q  N  1)!
i (||{yl})
2 (1  I (||{yl}))
N31 I (||{yl})
Q3N31 j({yl})g{yl}g|
Again, note that I (||{yl}) is decreasing in each yl. Dividing the above by Imax (K>} + %)
Q for
some %A0, the integral goes to inﬁnity as Q goes to inﬁnity. Dividing by Imax (K>}  %)
Q,
42the integral goes to zero. Since % was arbitrary, we must have that !(}) goes to zero at a rate
proportional to Imax (K>})
Q.S i n c e Imax (K>})
Q is strictly decreasing in }, we again have that
u3!(})
u3!(}0) goes to inﬁnity with Q for y0 AyA0, and hence a call option dominates just like in the single
asset case (except for a vanishingly small range around y =0 ). The rate of convergence of a call
option that starts paying o at } is proportional to Imax (K>})
Q. Note that the smaller Imax (K>}),
the faster the convergence. Therefore, the larger imax (K +1 >}), the faster the convergence.
I now show that if the seller decides to raise a certain amount of capital F per asset, underpricing
is larger for pooled sales than individual sales for Q large. This proves the result, since it shows
that you can raise more capital for the same amount of underpricing with individual sales. I show
it for the case of a pool of two components ] = Y1+Y2
2 versus sale of the individual components.
The proof generalizes easily to the case of more components. To raise F per component when
selling the pool ], the optimal security for Q su!ciently large is a call option with strike price }0











gy = F (A.4)
Similarly, for individual sale of component Y1 (and symmetrically for Y2), the optimal security is
equity with cut o value } such that
Z }
}
(y1  })j(y1)gy1 = F (A.5)
We know that the underpricing of the pooled asset goes to zero at rate proportional to i (K +1|{b y1>b y2})=
S (\q1 =1|b y1)S (\q2 =1|b y2) where {b y1>b y2} minimize i (K +1|{y1>y 2}) subject to y1+y2
2 = }0,
while the underpricing for the individual asset goes to zero at rate S (\q1 =1|}).I fy1 in i (K +1|{y1>y 2})
can be set lower or equal to } while still having y1+y2
2 = }0, the result follows immediately since
S (\q1 =1|y1) is increasing in y1. This is so since in that case we have S (\q1 =1|b y1)S (\q2 =1|b y2) 
S (\q1 =1|y1)S (\q2 =1|y2) ?S(\q1 =1|}), so the underpricing for the individual asset goes
to zero faster. For this not to hold, it is therefore necessary that }0 A }+}
2 . I show that this is not
possible while preserving the capital raising conditions A.4 and A.5. Equivalently, I show that for
}0 = }+}
2 , the expected value of the capital raised in the pool is smaller than the expected value of


















(y1  })j (y1)gy1 (A.6)
















j (y1)j(2y  y1)gy1




































(x  } + y1  })j (x)gxj (y1)gy1







(x  } + y1  })j(x)gx  (y1  })
¶
j(y1)gy1  0 (A.7)










(y1  })j (x)gx
 (y1  })
The ﬁrst relation follows from x  }. This shows that individual sales dominate. The rest of the
proposition follows directly from Proposition 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 :
Again, the maximization can be done pointwise for each |= Suppose you ﬁx  and L   (1  f)=
Then, an optimal security has to solve
max
z(]>|):(z(]>|)>|)=
H (]  z(]>|))
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The solution is to include component security 1]D} if
H (1]D}|\N+1 = |)
H (1]D}|\N+1 = \N = |)
 







1xDT31(L>}+L3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¢  
Since we know from Proposition 6 that this ratio is increasing in }> it follows that debt is optimal.
Now, suppose an investment policy L (|) is ﬁxed but the ﬁrm needs to decide how much capital
 
L(|)
13f to raise. Suppose the ﬁrm decides to raise an extra dollar. This increases cash ﬂow by a
safe 1  f dollars. But G(|) has to go up by at least one dollar to compensate investors. Hence,
the ﬁrm’s retained stake must go down. Thus,  =
L(|)
13f= A similar argument taking the derivative
w.r.t. the optimal investment level shows that it is below the ﬁrst best level.
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48Notes
1In a pooling equilibrium, debt has the lowest underpricing (see, for example, Nachman and
Noe (1994)). In a separating equilibrium, where a ﬁrm can signal its quality by costly retention as
in DeMarzo (1997), issuing debt makes mimicking by worse ﬁrms the least tempting.
2In other asset-backed securities markets, such as the market for mortgage-backed securities, it
may be harder to argue that investors have superior knowledge about the quality of the actual assets
(such as an individual real estate property). However, there may be other sources of private infor-
mation that are important. Buyers in these markets are generally large investment banks, brokerage
ﬁrms, and institutional investors, who have substantial expertise in valuing the securities issued
through their knowledge of secondary market conditions or their access to proprietary valuation
models. Bernardo and Cornell (1997), in analyzing data from an auction of collateralized mortgage
obligations in which the participants were major investment ﬁrms, found that the dispersion of
bids in the auction was surprisingly high. This indicates that investors had signiﬁcant dierences
in valuation ex ante, and Bernardo and Cornell provide evidence that these dierences were mainly
attributable to private information regarding valuation rather than, for example, dierences in the
utility of holding the assets.
3Throughout, I separate between random variables and their realizations by denoting random
variables with capital letters and outcomes with lowercase letters.
4All results go through when the density does not exist (for examle, when ] is discrete-valued).
5An alternative interpretation of the model is that the seller, as opposed to bidders, values
consumption in period zero at 1+u relative to period one and consumes any amount  raised.
6At the expense of some generality, I write u as a function of ] directly instead of malking both
of them depend on some underlying state of the world. This is done purely to save on notational
overhead and does not aect any of the results.
7Transaction costs can be quite large when securities are issued. For example, in the U.S.,
underwriters typically charge 7% of proceeds in initial public oerings.
8For the main part of the paper, I assume that the seller cannot pledge any of the cashﬂow from
49the new project to investors, because of unmodelled moral hazard or information problems. This
restriction is purely for expositional and analytical convenience. The qualitative nature of results
go through when cashﬂows from the new project backs securities, as shown in Section V B.
9Given the assumption that signals are drawn independently conditional on the realization of
the cash ﬂow }> the MLRP assumption is equivalent to the standard assumption in auction theory
that the random variables of the model are a!liated (see Milgrom and Weber (1982a)). The model
is a special case of the “general symmetric model” of Milgrom and Weber. The most important
restriction relative to the more general model is the assumption that bidders have the same valuation
of realized cash ﬂows. If bidders dier in their marginal utility of cash ﬂow in dierent states, which
would be the case for example if risk sharing in the economy was incomplete, there would be an
extra incentive for the ﬁrm to design securities that facilitate risk sharing. For models that analyze
the risk sharing motive of security design, see Allen and Gale (1988) and Du!e and Jackson (1989).
10The continuous representation of a discrete signal space can be viewed as the original signal
plus a draw from a bidders mixing strategy. (See, for example, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997)
for a similar way of representing signals.) This representation is useful because strategies are often
mixed in a discrete signal space, but are pure in the continuous signal [.
11See, for example, Nachman and Noe (1994) . Suppose z(}) is decreasing on a region d?}?e ,
and that the underlying cash ﬂow turns out to be d. The seller then has an incentive to secretly
borrow money from a third party and add it on to the aggregate cash ﬂow to push it into the
decreasing region, thereby reducing the payment to the security holder while still being able to pay
back the third party. Similarly, if the seller’s retained claim }z(}) is decreasing over some region
d?} e and the realized cash ﬂow is e, the seller has a strong incentive to decrease the observed
cash ﬂow by engaging in some type of “money burning”.
Obviously, if possible, the seller can also decrease the observed cash ﬂow by appropriating it
secretly for his own consumption. But allowing for this possibility would introduce as severe a
moral hazard problem with monotonic securities, and would therefore make any sale of securities
impossible.
12Ruling out non-monotonic securities is also convenient for technical reasons. With monotonic
securities, MLRP on the signal space with respect to security cash ﬂows is preserved, which allows
me to use standard auction theory results for the characterization of equilibria. Some type of single
50crossing requirement like MLRP or a!liation (see Milgrom and Weber (1982a)) is almost always
assumed in the auction theory literature, leading to a straightforward ranking of signals from high
to low in the bidding game. With non-monotonic securities, this ranking is no longer preserved and
equilibrium analysis becomes much more complicated.
13See Spatt and Srivastava (1991), who show the equivalence between the bookbuilding procedure
and the sealed bid uniform price auction.
14It is worth pointing out that Lemma 1 also holds if the security is split into “sub securities”
that are sold in simultaneous auctions. This is immediate from the linearity of the price function,
and the fact that the price-setting signal \N+1 = | is the same across auctions:
 (z1 + z2>|)=H (z1 + z2|\N = \N+1 = |)
= H (z1|\N = \N+1 = |)+H (z2|\N = \N+1 = |)
=  (z1>|)+ (z2>|)
Since the price is the same state by state, revenues are unchanged. Thus, there is no loss of
generality from restricting attention to the issuance of one security, as long as securities can only
be sold simultaneously.
This may not be true if securities are allowed to be auctioned sequentially, since information
revealed in early auctions may aect the equilibrium in later auctions. I discuss sales mechanisms
that utilize more information in Section IV.
15For the case of two bidders and discrete signals, the equilibrium is in pure strategies, which
is why I do not use the less transparent continuous representation of signals in the example. For
more than two bidders, the equilibrium is mixed if signals are expressed in discrete form.
16See above for the continuous representation of a discrete information structure.
17In particular, the fraction of winning investors must be smaller than the probability of getting
the highest possible discrete signal. This will alway be true if the number of winning investors N
is held constant and the number of investors Q goes to inﬁnity.
5118Although the debt result for normally distributed signals in Proposition 3 may suggest that
debt should become optimal, the proposition is not directly applicable to the case where the number
of signals go up for two reasons. First, the distribution of ] is not necessarily normal. Second, when
investors have multidimensional signals, the bidding equilibrium derived in Proposition 5 does not
necessarily hold (see Section A for a further discussion of the multidimensional signal case).
19For a similar result in the signalling literature, see Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Constanti-
nides and Grundy (1989).
20Proof available upon request.
21Hence, I assume the pooling decision is done ex ante so it does not depend on bidder information.
An interesting extension would be to analyze ex post design at the pool level as well.
22In the general multidimensional case it is not possible to ﬁnd a su!cient statistic that also
satisﬁes MLRP, which is the condition used to ensure the monotone equilibrium in Lemma 1.
23If there are more than one systematic factors aecting cash-ﬂows, results on pooling will be less
clear-cut. It is typically optimal to pool assets that are aected by the same systematic factors to get
rid of informational rents created by unsystematic information. However, if dierent asset classes
are subject to dierent systematic factors, whether one big pool should be created or whether there
should be one pool for each class of assets will depend on the speciﬁcs of the signal distribution.
24Proposition 9 assumes there is no systematic factor. This is because there is typically no one
dimensional su!cient statistic that can act as an aggregate signal for a pool with a systematic
factor, which makes it technically di!cult to characterize the equilibrium.
25Alternatively, one can introduce an ex post moral hazard problem where the ﬁrm maximizes
his own stake after capital has been raised. This does not change the solution to the ex post
security design problem. In the ex ante security design problem, it will push the security design in
the direction of straight equity since straight equity aligns the ex post incentives of the ﬁrm and
investors. Indeed, one can show that if f =0 , straight equity becomes the optimal ex ante security
design as the number of investors becomes large.
26If it is infeasible to ﬁnd a su!ciently large number of assets at any single point in time for this
type of pooling to be beneﬁcial, it may be possible for an intermediary to engage in intertemporal
52pooling. For example, an underwriter who is involved in a large number of IPOs over time may
be able to synthesize pooling by giving preferential treatment to investors who take allocations in
each IPO, making it harder for investors to “cherry pick” (see Benveniste and Spindt (1989) for a
theoretical IPO model with this ﬂavor and Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) for empirical evidence).
27See, for example, DeGroot (1986).
28I cannot write i (\N+1 = ||y)= Q!
N!(Q3N31)!i (||y)(1 I (||y))
N I (||y)
Q3N31 anymore,
as it is no longer necessarily true that the aggregate signal [ for bidder q is independent of signal
[0 of bidder p conditional on the sum of values } =
P
yl: i ([ = {>[0 = {0 |}) 6= i ({|})i ({0 |}).
Only if I condition on the whole vector {yl} does conditional independence hold.
53Figure 1: Net beneﬁt !(}) when ] is uniform on the unit interval, and signals can be high or low
with probability S(K|})=}= The number of units sold is N =1and the productivity of capital is
u = =1=
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